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UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 
C. BRYAN WILSON 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Although each member of the United States House of 
Representatives must stand for reelection every two years, the 
number of competitive races is in fact quite low.1 In 2004, experts 
predict fewer than forty close House races out of the 435 total seats 
on the ballot across the country.2 From the beginning of the current 
 
Copyright © 2004 by C. Bryan Wilson. 
 1. See Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the Two-Party Duopoly Has Done 
to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1219, 1232–33 (1997) (“In 1986, 
1988 and 1990, 98 percent of congressional incumbents who sought re-election were successful. 
In 1992, . . . 95 percent of incumbents seeking re-election were successful; and in 1994, despite 
the earthquake producing the first two-House Republican majorities in 42 years, incumbent re-
election rate was 91 percent.”); Erin P. Billings, Democrats Urged to Seek More Targets In 
Effort to Take Back House Majority, ROLL CALL, Feb. 3, 2003, available at LEXIS, Legis 
Library, Rollcl File (“Since 1998 . . . roughly 40 house seats—less than 10 percent of the overall 
body—have been truly competitive and closely contested by the parties.”); see also Stephen 
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 598, 608 (2000) (listing some of the complaints about the lack of competitive congressional 
elections, including “the high incumbent reelection rate (averaging over 95 percent since 1980); 
the ‘vanishing marginals’; the incumbency advantage in vote-share, around 8 percent; and the 
huge advantage incumbents have in fundraising”) (citations omitted). 
 2. See Stuart Rothenberg, Less Is More in ‘04: DCCC Should Narrow, Not Expand, Target 
List, ROLL CALL, July 21, 2003, available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (noting that 
“savvy Democratic insiders believe that their party should focus on no more than 15 to 20 
Republican-held and soon-to-be-open House districts” to have any legitimate chance to reduce 
the GOP House majority); The Few, The Not So Proud; It’s Hard to Find Vulnerable House 
Incumbents This Cycle, ROLL CALL, Nov. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl 
File (“The decennial redistricting process left so few competitive House districts that it has 
become considerably more difficult to compile [Roll Call’s] traditional 10 most vulnerable 
House incumbents list.”); Lauren W. Whittington, House Outlook; Even if There Is an Anti-
Republican Wave in 2004, Democrats May Not Be Able to Ride It to Shore, ROLL CALL, Nov. 10, 
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constitutional system, redistricting has taken place every ten years, 
following the census.3 However, today, in some states redistricting 
battles are waged every year.4 Contributing to this increase in 
litigation, redistricting law is nebulous and courts have been willing to 
play substantial roles in redistricting disputes.5 The explosion of 
redistricting litigation highlights a conflict between two seemingly 
compatible schools of constitutional interpretation—federalism and 
textualism—that must eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
This conflict, as shown through a recent dispute over the 
interpretation of the word “legislature” in Article I, Section 4 of the 
United States Constitution, is the focus of this Note. 
On its face, Article I, Section 4 grants state legislatures authority 
to redistrict their states’ respective congressional districts. This power 
is limited by Congress, which can impose rules and regulations on the 
states’ redistricting. The pertinent part of Article I, Section 4 reads, 
 
2003, available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (“Although party leaders and strategists 
routinely cite a 40-seat battleground of targeted races in 2004, Democrats had fewer than a 
dozen challengers who were raising money in these districts at the end of September 
[2003] . . . .”). 
 3. For a general overview of the history of redistricting, see 2 CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 900–11 (5th ed. 2000). See also Alison Mitchell, 
Redistricting 2002 Produces No Great Shake-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A20 (“While 
the trend toward fewer competitive House races has been building for decades, political analysts 
generally rely on the reconfiguration of House lines every 10 years to provide an initial period 
of ferment and more political opportunity.”). 
 4. The very narrow margin by which the Republicans control the House, see CONG. Q., 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 2004: THE 108TH CONGRESS v (David Hawkings & Brian Nuttig eds., 
2003), combined with the dearth of competitive seats, makes the political stakes too high to wait 
a whole decade to redraw the congressional lines whenever a party seizes control of the state 
process. See David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1 (discussing impending votes on new redistricting plans in Texas and 
Colorado, with the possibility of additional votes in Illinois, California, and Oklahoma). 
 5. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be a Liberal to Hate the Racial 
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 825 (1998) (“Because the states are left with little 
or no margin of error in an area where the legal standards are neither clear nor stable, there will 
almost certainly be an increase in litigation and, as a result, increased intervention into the 
states’ representational politics by federal judges.”); see also Samuel Isaacharoff, 
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 638–39 (2002): 
  First, now that the post-1990 round of redistricting litigation has concluded, there 
is every reason to suspect that future redistricting fights will be framed in the 
inflammatory language of race to increase the possibility of subsequent judicial 
revision. . . . 
  The second, and more salient, detrimental incentive the Court established was 
that opponents of the post-1990 districts had to construct their racial challenges after 
the fact, once Shaw I had given a green light to such claims. Imagine the effect on 
redistricting debates in the post-2000 round now that any salting of the record with 
racial issues may enhance the prospects of judicial oversight . . . . 
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“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”6 One of the 
foremost limitations on many states’ ability to redistrict is the Voting 
Rights Act.7 Although this law is both lengthy and complicated, 
basically it limits state action in applicable states by prohibiting any 
change in voting procedures (including voter eligibility requirements 
and the location of polling places) without prior approval (or 
preclearance) from the Department of Justice or an appropriate 
three-judge panel.8 This requirement, combined with the Supreme 
Court’s recent Equal Protection jurisprudence,9 which prohibits racial 
gerrymandering in redistricting, has led to substantial litigation 
centering on the redistricting process in states subject to the Act. 
Through the court system, this process illustrates an ongoing source 
of tension between federal and state authorities: states must receive 
permission from the federal government to alter their districts, and 
they can be haled into federal court to defend their conduct. In the 
current political environment, the stakes of this political tug-of-war 
are high.10 
A recent case introduced a new constitutional battleground in 
this struggle: the interpretation of the word “legislature” in Article I, 
Section 4. In Branch v. Smith,11 a federal district court introduced a 
novel constitutional theory that a state chancery court had no 
jurisdiction to redraw the state’s congressional districts. The court 
viewed Article I, Section 4 as allowing only the state legislature to 
draw the congressional districts; absent express authority from the 
legislative body, the state court could not do so.12 This theory served 
as the “alternative” holding of the three-judge district court.13 The 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 7. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2000)). Note that only some states (and some parts of states) are 
subject to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. See infra note 42 for a brief discussion of 
the jurisdictions covered. 
 8. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 10. See supra note 4. 
 11. Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Branch 
v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429 (2003). For clarity, the case will be referred to as Branch throughout 
this Note, whether discussing the district court’s opinion or the Supreme Court’s. 
 12. Id. at 550. 
 13. Id. at 549. 
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court independently invalidated the redistricting plan for violating 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act for failing the “timely 
preclearance” requirement.14 Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court on the latter ground, avoiding the 
constitutional issue.15 This Note explores Branch’s alternative holding 
and the interpretive problems it creates between federalist and 
textualist constitutional interpretations, resolving the impending 
collision in favor of federalism and state courts.16 
The alternative holding of Branch is flawed.17 In light of 
interpretations of Article I, Section 4 and case law like Growe v. 
Emison,18 which encouraged federal courts to defer to state 
redistricting efforts, 19 it seems clear that reapportioning congressional 
districts is a state function subject to numerous federal safeguards, 
principally the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution.20 Also, 
adherence to the overarching tenets of the Constitution requires 
 
 14. Id. A three-judge district court panel heard Branch pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) 
(2000), which directs redistricting disputes to these somewhat rare federal district courts. 
Decisions of these three-judge panels proceed directly to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000).  
 15. See Branch, 123 S. Ct. at 1437 (“Since we affirm the injunction on the basis of the 
District Court’s principal stated ground that the state-court plan had not been precleared and 
had no prospect of being precleared in time for the 2002 election, we have no occasion to 
address the District Court’s alternative holding that the State Chancery Court’s redistricting 
plan was unconstitutional . . . and therefore we vacate it as a basis for the injunction.”). 
 16. This illustrates some of the differences between two schools of interpretation 
frequently viewed as highly similar and endorsed by the “New Federalists” of the Rehnquist 
Court. Additionally, this issue may serve to demonstrate how the two schools of thought work 
in tandem to find the true meaning of the Constitution. See John Duffy, Federalism Revived? 
The Printz and City of Boerne Decisions, Address Before the Federalism and Separation of 
Powers Practice Group Panel of The Federalist Society (Oct. 17, 1997), at http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/federalism/fd020103.htm (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal):  
[T]his enterprise—interpreting the enumerated powers with care—is a textually 
rigorous way to protect federalism. . . . [A]ll true Federalists [should] . . . embrace the 
Court’s rediscovered enterprise of interpreting the congressional powers faithfully 
and to think of decisions like Printz, New York v. United States, and City of Boerne, 
not as cases based solely on ‘underlying postulates’ of federalism, but as based on the 
textual limits of congressional power.  
(emphasis added). 
 17. The Article I, Section 4 argument is novel because most of the recent redistricting 
litigation and Supreme Court jurisprudence has focused on the Equal Protection clause and the 
Voting Rights Act. See infra notes 38–48 and accompanying text. 
 18. 507 U.S. 25 (1993). 
 19. Id. at 33; see infra notes 117–119, 129–132 and accompanying text.  
 20. Cf. Growe, 507 U.S. at 34 (“[T]he doctrine of Germano prefers both state branches 
[legislative and judicial] to federal courts as agents of apportionment.”).  
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federal courts to stay their hand21 before invading the states’ province 
in creating congressional districts. Accordingly, in the spirit of comity 
and federalism, federal courts should not strip state courts of 
jurisdiction over redistricting cases, even if the state courts physically 
redraw the districts after finding a constitutional infirmity. Branch’s 
alternative holding is incorrect because the Mississippi constitution 
gave the chancery court authority, albeit attenuated, to redistrict the 
state.22 Although the United States Constitution trumps all other 
concerns, it cannot be read in a vacuum: Article I, Section 4 “imposes 
a duty” on states to draw congressional lines much like Article II, 
Section 1 requires states to appoint electors for president and vice 
president.23 For this reason, if a state legislature is unable to perform 
this task, a state court should be given a reasonable opportunity to act 
on the state’s behalf. The legislative scheme should receive priority; if 
the state court determines, in accordance with state law, that the 
legislature cannot accomplish this goal, the court may use its 
equitable powers to do so. Only if the state court lacks all authority to 
draw congressional districts under Article I, Section 4, or threatens its 
citizens’ constitutional rights by refusing to do so, should a federal 
court intervene. 
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the pertinent legal challenges 
to congressional redistricting plans and the constitutional issue raised 
in Branch v. Smith. It then introduces the jurisprudential tension 
 
 21. See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (“We believe the District Court should 
have stayed its hand. The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or 
to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but 
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.”). 
 22. Mississippi state courts have jurisdiction over “[a]ll matters in equity.” MISS. CONST. 
art. 6, § 159. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically held that the chancery 
court at issue had jurisdiction over this case. In re Mauldin, No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Dec. 13, 
2001), cited and quoted in Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 557 (S.D. Miss. 2002), 
vacated by Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So.2d 429 (Miss. 2003). In Branch, the three-judge panel 
conceded that the state supreme court had ruled specifically in the chancery court’s favor on this 
point, but dismissed the holding partially because “[t]he court did not provide any basis for its 
holding, did not refer to its earlier cases to the contrary, and did not point to any legislative 
authority that authorized the chancery court to act.” Smith II, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
 However, it is important—and an interesting political point—to note that the 
Mississippi Supreme Court later vacated the opinion on which both the district court and United 
States Supreme Court relied in Branch. See Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So.2d 429 (Miss. 2003) 
(“[C]hancery courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over congressional redistricting.”). 
 23. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that “there 
are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a 
particular branch of state government” in discussing Article I, Section 2); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 2; infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
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between these two interpretations of the issue.24 Part II examines the 
textual approach to Article I, Section 4. Part III evaluates Article I, 
Section 4 in a broader, federalist sense. The conclusion offers a 
resolution to the conflict between the two interpretations and urges 
federal courts to avoid the temptation of invoking Article I, Section 4 
to seize control of the redistricting process from the states. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part of the Note focuses on the typical constitutional 
challenges to redistricting plans, including a brief discussion of the 
major cases and statutory provisions at issue. Additionally, this Part 
introduces the scant case law interpreting Article I, Section 4 of the 
United States Constitution, and focuses on Article II, Section 1 of the 
Constitution, which the Supreme Court views as “parallel” to Article 
I, Section 4.25 Finally, this Part establishes the conceptual framework 
examined more thoroughly in Parts II and III. 
A. General Redistricting Requirements and Legal Challenges 
Ever since Baker v. Carr,26 when the Supreme Court held that 
redistricting schemes no longer present nonjusticiable political 
questions,27 significant litigation has accompanied the redistricting 
process. For better or worse, almost every new round of redistricting 
involves litigation.28 Litigation is almost perpetual in some states, 
where new lines must be drawn even before existing redistricting 
cases are resolved.29 
 
 24. Obviously, there are numerous ways of interpreting the Constitution. This Note focuses 
only on textualism and federalism for two reasons. First, these two views of the constitution are 
important for determining how the Supreme Court might decide redistricting cases. Second, this 
focus highlights the tension between two schools of interpretation that frequently reach the 
same conclusions. 
 25. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804–05 (1995); see infra notes 68–78 
and accompanying text. 
 26. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 27. Id. at 209. 
 28. See Isaacharoff, supra note 5. 
 29. Both Texas and North Carolina, for example, had ongoing redistricting litigation 
throughout the 1990s that never resulted in a permanent, constitutional apportionment plan. 
See, e.g., infra notes 45, 47 (discussing some of this litigation). 
This cycle is about to intensify, as states attempt to redistrict every year (not just every 
ten years). See Halbfinger, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing impending votes on new redistricting 
plans in Texas and Colorado, with the possibility of additional votes in Illinois, California, and 
Oklahoma, despite the fact that each of these states passed new congressional district maps 
immediately following the 2000 census). Courts disagree over whether state legislatures have 
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The Constitution mandates reapportionment of congressional 
seats after every decennial census.30 There are two main aspects to 
reapportionment: (1) determining how many congressional 
representatives each state will receive,31 and (2) redrawing the actual 
district lines within each state. Congress determines part one,32 and 
the states have responsibility for part two.33 Although the 
constitutional authority vested in the states is broad, they are subject 
to congressional regulations like the Voting Rights Act.34 
Additionally, states must conform to other constitutional 
requirements such as the “one person, one vote” principle.35 Beyond 
these limitations, however, states are free to redistrict themselves as 
they see fit. In fact, state legislatures have so much authority in this 
process—and can thereby affect the congressional agenda by favoring 
one party’s incumbents over another’s—that the national parties pay 
close attention to state legislative elections preceding redistricting 
years.36 By stacking the deck in favor of one party or another in key 
 
the right to redistrict every year. Compare People ex. rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 
1240 (Colo. 2003) (“[T]he framers of the Colorado Constitution intended that congressional 
districts must only be drawn once per decade.”), with Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 
(E.D. Tex. 2004) (“We . . . reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the Texas Legislature lacked 
authority to draw new districts after a federal court drew them following the 2000 census.”). 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  
 31. See id. Of course the Fourteenth Amendment repealed the first line of this clause, striking 
the offensive “three-fifths compromise” from the nation’s governing document. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State . . . .”). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”). 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”); 
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 364–67 (1932) (including reapportionment as part of the “manner” 
in which states determine how to conduct elections).  
 34. See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
 35. This general principle is derived from several Supreme Court cases. See Kirkpatrick v. 
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527–28 (1969) (“[A]s nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964))); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“[A]n individual’s right to vote 
for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion 
diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”). 
 36. See Steven Hill, Behind Closed Doors: The Recurring Plague of Redistricting and the 
Politics of Geography, 91 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 317, 325 (2002) (“In fact, numerous observers have 
stated that the outcome of the 1994 elections, when Republicans took control of Congress for 
the first time in forty years, was due in no small part to Republican gains made during the 1991–
92 redistricting.”); DCCC Cries Foul Over NRCC Contribution to Schrock, BULL.’S 
FRONTRUNNER, June 27, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Frntrn File (“The NRCC 
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states, state legislatures can alter the makeup of the House of 
Representatives and subsequently alter the national agenda 
emanating from the House. In this way, redistricting can have 
national implications. However, in America’s dual federal system, a 
state’s right to compose its own congressional districts is also of vital 
importance to the state’s own sovereignty.37 
The Voting Rights Act38 often provides the primary mechanism 
for challenging redistricting schemes. This law, enacted to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment,39 sets forth numerous requirements that states 
(and parts of states) covered by the law must meet before making any 
changes to their election laws.40 The impetus behind the Voting 
 
[National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, whose goal is to elect Republicans 
to the U.S. House of Representatives] ‘says it poured more than $700,000 into Virginia 
Republican party and campaign committees in 1999 for state races and party building, in part to 
influence federal and state legislative redistricting next year.’”); Kathy Kiely & Jim Drinkard, 
The Hidden Election, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2000, at A1 (chronicling the actions of the national 
political parties, particularly their congressional campaign committees, as they prepared to 
spend millions on state legislative elections in 2000—the last election year before the most 
recent census and mandatory reapportionment). 
 In fact, the national parties also pay close attention to control of the state legislative 
redistricting process. The reason is simple: if the state legislative lines are politically 
gerrymandered, a given party will then control the statehouse. The party in control of the 
statehouse will in turn gerrymander the state to favor that party’s congressional candidates. See 
Leslie Wayne, National Parties Donate to State Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at A24: 
  Mr. Blackwell, the [Republican] State Treasurer in Ohio, said Republicans gave 
him additional money [for his Secretary of State campaign] after he decided not to 
oppose Mr. Taft in a [Republican] primary [for governor]. The party also contributed 
to his campaign because, as secretary of state, Mr.  Blackwell would cast one of the 
five votes on the state reapportionment board, which draws the districts for the state 
Legislature. State lawmakers, in turn, draw the map for the United States House 
districts. 
 37. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (“Federal-court review of districting 
legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions.”). 
 38. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2000)). 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437.  
 40. The two main sources of litigation under the Voting Rights Act are from sections 2 and 
5. Section 2 reads, “[n]o voting . . . procedure shall be . . . applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race . . . or in contravention of the guarantees set forth 
[elsewhere in the Act].” Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). See Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a 
violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant 
legal standard the ‘results test’ . . . .”). Section 2 can be used to require majority-minority 
districts where minority communities have been pulled out of majority-minority districts to 
benefit white incumbents. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993) (“Dividing the 
minority group among various districts so that it is a majority in none may prevent the group 
from electing its candidate of choice . . . .”). For a discussion of Section 5, see infra note 43. 
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Rights Act was the desire to prevent states from disenfranchising 
minority voters by denying their right to vote or diluting their votes.41 
The Act requires some states and parts of states, primarily in the 
South,42 to preclear any change of electoral plans with the United 
States Department of Justice or the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.43 
Equal Protection challenges to state redistricting plans,44 a more 
recent development, have become an additional source of litigation.45 
According to the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the 
matter, race considerations can be used in redistricting schemes as 
long as they are not the “predominant factor.”46 If race is the 
 
 41. Previous attempts at enforcing voting rights laws encountered “serious obstacles in 
various regions of the country,” prompting support of the Voting Rights Act. H.R. REP. NO. 89-
439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441. See also id. at 2484–85 (statement of Rep. 
Cahill) (“If there are any doubts of the need for federal legislation in this field, an examination 
of the report [of the U.S. Commission of Civil Rights] and its account of intimidation, reprisal, 
interference, and violence will, I submit, be most convincing.”). 
 42. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (establishing the formula for 
determining which jurisdictions are subject to the preclearance requirement); Procedures for the 
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. (2003) 
(listing jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Easing 
the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1569, 1587 n.87 (2002): 
Basically the formula looks at two factors: whether, on one of three specified dates, a 
jurisdiction conditioned the right to vote by imposing a literacy ‘test or device’ . . . and 
whether, on that date, either less than fifty percent of the persons of voting age were 
registered to vote or less than fifty percent of such persons voted in the presidential 
election. 
 43. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000) (requiring preclearance 
by any “covered jurisdiction” seeking to implement a new “standard, practice, or procedure 
with respect to voting”); Scope of Requirement, 28 C.F.R. § 51.12 (2003) (requiring 
preclearance of “[a]ny change affecting voting,” no matter how minor); see also Beer v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1976) (requiring the submitting state to prove that the change 
would neither “lead to a retrogression in the [political] position of racial minorities” nor have a 
racially discriminatory purpose or effect). 
 44. These challenges build on Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims. See supra note 35. 
 45. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that appellants 
“state[d] a claim under the Equal Protection Clause” to challenge North Carolina’s redistricting 
scheme); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996) (deciding that the plan at issue in 
Shaw I did in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause); Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I), 526 
U.S. 541, 551–552 (1999) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
challengers because the state had a nonracial motive for the redistricting plan, which created an 
issue of triable fact); Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (reversing the 
district court’s conclusion that North Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing 
its congressional district boundaries).  
 46. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he Constitution does not place an affirmative 
obligation upon the legislature to avoid creating districts that turn out to be heavily, even 
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predominant factor behind a redistricting scheme, strict scrutiny 
applies.47 In the past, courts have assumed that state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over legal challenges to redistricting plans 
under the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution.48 However, this 
assumption is now under attack.49 
Branch arose following the 2000 census, when the Mississippi 
legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan for the state’s 
congressional districts.50 Lawsuits were filed in both state and federal 
court.51 A state chancery court asserted jurisdiction and began the 
process of redrawing the state’s congressional districts.52 Even though 
the state supreme court upheld the chancery court’s jurisdiction,53 
opponents challenged the chancery court’s decision in federal court 
on two grounds: (1) that the chancery court’s plan could not be 
 
majority, minority. It simply imposes an obligation not to create such districts for predominantly 
racial, as opposed to political or traditional, districting motivations.”). 
 47. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 653. The details of both the Voting Rights Act and the Shaw 
progeny are outside the scope of this Note, but they are pertinent as the source of most 
redistricting litigation. One reason for frequent litigation in this area is that standards are very 
difficult to ascertain. For a discussion of the Voting Rights Act, Shaw, and the current state of 
the law, see Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina: A Personal Perspective, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1327 (2001) (discussing the original Shaw case and the effects on the decision 
by the Court’s most recent pronouncement, Hunt v. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), and 
expressing disappointment that the Court failed to “provide an incentive for abandoning racial 
gerrymanders, rather than disguising them”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: 
Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1998) (discussing the state of the 
law and predicting challenges that will arise in the wake of the 2000 census). See also id. at 758–
62 (elaborating upon the extent of state courts’ involvement in this process); Robert F. Kravetz, 
Recent Decision, Where Race and Political Behavior Highly Correlate Within a Congressional 
District, it is Unlikely that the District Will be Held to be an Unconstitutional Racial 
Gerrymander: Easley v. Cromartie, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 561 (2002) (discussing Cromartie and its 
implications). 
 48. See, e.g., Adams County Election Comm’n v. Sanders, 586 So. 2d 829, 831 (Miss. 1991) 
(“[S]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to decide whether § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act applies to contemplated changes in election procedures . . . . [but] state courts 
may not actually grant pre-clearance [to an apportionment plan].”). 
 49. See Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 558 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (finding that 
the chancery court does not have jurisdiction over redistricting matters unless it was granted by 
the Mississippi state legislature). 
 50. Branch v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429, 1433 (2003). 
 51. Id. at 1433–34. 
 52. Id. at 1434. 
 53. In re Mauldin, No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Dec. 13, 2001), vacated by Mauldin v. Branch, 
866 So.2d 429 (Miss. 2003). The fact that the state supreme court later vacated this decision is 
irrelevant in considering the Branch litigation for purposes of this Note. See supra note 22. The 
vacation of In re Mauldin occurred well after the federal litigation discussed here; additionally, 
this Note focuses primarily on the theoretical issues raised by Branch and not the case itself. See 
infra note 57. 
071604 WILSON.DOC 9/17/2004 2:04 PM 
2004] CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING SUITS 1377 
precleared54 in time for primary elections because preclearance would 
be needed for both the plan itself and for the chancery court’s 
jurisdiction to redistrict the state;55 and (2) that the chancery court 
lacked jurisdiction to reapportion the congressional districts under 
Article I, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution.56 The district court 
ruled in favor of the challengers on both issues, rejecting the chancery 
court’s plan and redrawing the congressional districts itself.57 
B. Article I, Section 4 
The Constitution gives states authority through their legislatures 
to determine the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional 
elections.58 Redistricting fits within this clause as part of the “manner” 
of holding elections for the House of Representatives.59 
There is very little case law interpreting the meaning of 
“Legislature” in Article I, Section 4. In Davis v. Hildebrant,60 the 
Court permitted a citizen initiative, as authorized by the state 
constitution, to reapportion the state’s districts, stating, “so far as the 
State had the power to [reapportion], the referendum constituted a 
part of the state constitution and laws and was contained within the 
legislative power.”61 The Court also invoked a state constitution in 
 
 54. See supra note 43. 
 55. Smith v. Clark (Smith I), 189 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507–08 (S.D. Miss. 2002). The district 
court viewed the chancery court’s grant of jurisdiction as “a change in Mississippi’s election 
procedures that must be precleared by federal authorities pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act” because previous decisions of the state supreme court, Brumfield v. Brock, 142 So. 745 
(Miss. 1932) and Wood v. State, 142 So. 747 (Miss. 1932), held that the chancery courts lacked 
jurisdiction over disputes relating to congressional redistricting plans. Smith I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 
507–08. However, these cases were decided well before Baker v. Carr. See supra notes 26–27 
and accompanying text. 
 56. Smith II, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59. 
 57. Id. Deeper examination of the facts underlying this case seems unnecessary for this 
Note, which focuses on the court’s alternative holding. For a more thorough analysis of the facts 
of Branch, see Jonathan H. Steinberg & Aimee Dudovitz, Branch v. Smith—Election Law 
Federalism after Bush v. Gore: Are State Courts Unconstitutional Interlopers in Congressional 
Redistricting?, 2 ELECTION L.J. 91 (2003). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. 
 59. See supra note 33. However, some courts believe that the states’ reapportionment 
authority comes from Article I, § 2 alone. See O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 859 (2002), 
aff’d mem., 123 S. Ct. 512 (2002) (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), for the 
proposition that “[Article I, Section 2] governs intrastate redistricting” and limiting Article I, 
Section 4 to “the Supreme Court’s admonition that states may not use section 4 to ‘immunize’ 
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional”). 
 60. 241 U.S. 565 (1916). 
 61. Id. at 568. 
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Smiley v. Holm,62 requiring the Minnesota legislature to act, subject to 
the governor’s veto.63 Justice Hughes found that the state legislature’s 
“exercise of . . . authority must be in accordance with the method 
which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.”64 In 
addition to the paucity of Supreme Court precedent, few lower courts 
have interpreted this part of the Constitution.65 
In light of the scant case law on the issue, Judge Jolly in Branch 
viewed the act of redrawing the congressional districts as a lawmaking 
role; and, even though the legislature itself is not required to draw the 
lines, he stated that any entity that undertakes that act must “find the 
source of its power to redistrict in some act of the legislature.”66 The 
Branch court found no statute or grant of legislative authority 
permitting the chancery court to redraw the state’s congressional 
districts, and thus determined that the chancery court’s action had 
violated Article I, Section 4.67 
The Supreme Court has viewed the duty imposed by Article I, 
Section 4 as “parallel” to the duty of states under Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 2 of the Constitution,68 which reads in part, “Each State shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 
Congress . . . .”69 Needless to say, Article II, Section 1 has received 
considerable attention from scholars in the wake of Bush v. Gore.70 
 
 62. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 63. Id. at 369. 
 64. Id. at 367. 
 65. One court held that Article I, Section 4 empowered only the state legislature, and 
rejected a state election board’s effort to reapportion the state. See Grills v. Branigin, 284 F. 
Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. Ind. 1968), aff’d per curiam, 391 U.S. 364 (1968) (“This power [to redistrict] 
is granted to the Indiana General Assembly and the Election Board does not possess the 
legislative power under the Indiana Constitution nor does it possess judicial power under the 
Indiana Constitution.”). 
 66. Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (S.D. Miss. 2002). 
 67. Id. But see In re Mauldin, No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Dec. 13, 2001) (finding jurisdiction), 
vacated, Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So. 2d 429 (2003) (holding that the chancery court had no 
jurisdiction over the case).  
 68. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804–05 (1995) (viewing the two 
clauses as “parallel” and as “express delegations of power to the States to act with respect to 
federal elections”). 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 70. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see, e.g., Richard Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature 
Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome of Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 634 
(2001) (defending the Rehnquist concurrence as the best rationale for the outcome of the case); 
Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 651–52 (2001) (arguing that the 
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This controversial case may provide insight into how the Court could 
approach the Article I, Section 4 issue. In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme 
Court held that Florida violated the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by relying on an inadequate and unfair vote-
counting method.71 More significantly for this Note, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, also asserted that 
the Florida Supreme Court had no authority to adjudicate the case 
before it.72 Under Article II, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution, the Florida legislature had the sole authority to choose 
the state’s presidential electors.73 Therefore, the concurring justices 
would have altogether prevented the Florida Supreme Court from 
infringing upon the legislature’s expressly granted authority—in this 
case, the (perceived) statutory mandate that the Florida Division of 
Elections not, under any circumstances, miss the federal “safe 
harbor” for delivering the state’s votes to Congress.74 Justice Stevens 
strongly disagreed, arguing that the Florida Supreme Court had the 
sole authority to interpret Florida’s laws.75 In light of controlling 
precedent, Stevens believed that the state court’s jurisdiction was 
both “consistent with, and indeed contemplated by, the grant of 
authority in Article II.”76  
If the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore is persuasive, state 
courts may indeed have no jurisdiction over redistricting matters: like 
the decisionmaking process for presidential electors, the 
determination of congressional districts could be an “exceptional 
case[] in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on 
a particular branch of a State’s government.”77 In contrast, if Justice 
 
Constitution and statutory scheme left the final decision to Congress and that the Supreme 
Court should not have enforced the “safe harbor” provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Erog .v Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 170 (2001) (arguing that the Article I rationale constituted only a “red herring,” that the 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds for the decision were a “shell game,” and that the entire case 
was a nonjusticiable political question). 
 71. 531 U.S. at 110. 
 72. See id. at 111–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The concurrence found that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s remedy jeopardized the legislature’s desire to use the safe harbor provided by 
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). Id. at 120–21 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 75. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that although “on rare occasions . . . 
federal judicial intervention in state elections” may be appropriate, Bush v. Gore did “not 
[present] such an occasion”). 
 76. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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Stevens’ view is persuasive, then Article I, Section 4, like Article II, 
views state legislatures in their “lawmaking capacity.” The legislature 
would be subject to ordinary judicial review within the state 
constitutional structure. Bush v. Gore can be distinguished because 
the state redistricting process may not rise to the “exceptional” level 
of selecting presidential electors.78 Additionally, even if one agrees 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court’s holding refers 
only to the selection of presidential electors, meaning that it cannot 
serve as controlling precedent for cases like Branch. 
Compounding the problem is the Court’s recent view of state-
federal relations. Decisions like New York v. United States,79 Printz v. 
United States,80 and National League of Cities v. Usery81 underscore the 
Rehnquist majority’s willingness to protect the integrity of states from 
intrusion by the federal government. Additionally, cases like United 
States v. Lopez82 and United States v. Morrison83 have made the 
Rehnquist Court famous for appreciating the separation of state 
responsibilities from federal responsibilities. In this respect, the 
 
 78. However, this distinction is not particularly strong. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803–04 (1995) (recognizing that members of Congress are federal 
officeholders, not solely representatives of the state). 
 79. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In this case, the Court held that the federal government cannot 
“commandeer” state governments into advancing federal regulatory aims because doing so 
“would . . . be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and 
state governments.” Id. at 175. 
 80. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). In Printz, the Court held that the federal government could not 
require local law enforcement officers to enforce part of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act. See id. at 933 (“[T]he obligation [imposed on ‘chief law enforcement officers’ by 
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (2000)] to ‘make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days 
whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law’ . . . is 
unconstitutional.”). Central to this holding was the belief that the Constitution allows the 
federal government power to regulate only “individuals, not states.” Id. at 920 (quoting New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166). 
 81. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985). In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist provided an early look at the 
jurisprudence that the Court under his leadership would later produce; his opinion looked to 
history, federalist principles, and “undoubted attribute[s] of state sovereignty” in recognizing, 
on Tenth Amendment grounds, that states are exempt from certain provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. 426 U.S. at 845. 
 82. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court invalidated part of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of 1990 for violating the Commerce Clause. See id. at 551. In his majority opinion, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of maintaining a “distinction between what 
is truly national and what is truly local.” Id. at 567–68. 
 83. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In Morrison, the Court reinvigorated Lopez by striking down the 
Violence Against Women Act for exceeding the bounds of the Commerce Clause, despite 
findings documented in the legislative history that Congress thought would obviate Commerce 
Clause objections. See id. at 614. 
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Article I, Section 4 conflict could present the Rehnquist Court with 
the same challenge it faced in Bush v. Gore: Does the Constitution’s 
text provide power only to a particular part of state government, or 
does it delegate power to the state as an entity? The same paradox 
that scholars have recognized after Bush v. Gore could arise in 
making such a determination.84 
C. The Conflict between Textualism and Federalism Inherent in 
Article I, Section 4 
The Article I, Section 4 argument in Branch merits a careful 
examination of the Constitution. For this purpose, this Note examines 
two approaches embraced by members of the Rehnquist Court: 
textualism and federalism. Frequently these two methods of 
interpretation are considered similar or identical—the five members 
of the Rehnquist majority frequently rely on both.85 In the abstract, 
 
 84. The paradox is that the conservative “states’ rights” judges will not hesitate to displace 
the decision of a state government and impose national control when it suits their political 
preferences. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 70, at 175 (discussing one caricature of the five judges in 
the majority in Bush v. Gore as “departing from their long-held states’ rights principles” to 
reach the political result they desired). 
 The cynical, political critique of Bush v. Gore––that the Republican Justices turned 
their backs on their own ideology to provide a victory for a Republican president, see id., seems 
equally applicable to Branch. There, the chancery court judge who attempted to draw the 
congressional districts was a Democrat, whereas each judge on the three-judge federal panel 
that denied the chancery court’s jurisdiction was appointed by a Republican president. See 
Patrice Sawyer, Judges Set Redistricting Deadline, THE CLARION-LEADER (Jackson, Miss.), 
Feb. 20, 2002, at 1A (emphasizing that a ruling against redistricting would serve Republican 
interests, and identifying the political affiliations of the judges involved); see also E.J. Dionne, 
Jr., Payback in Judges, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at A21 (discussing Branch as an example of 
judicial activism among Republican judges aiming “to remake the world according to the 
specifications of Justice Antonin Scalia”); Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Renewed 
Focus on Scalia Trip, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A26 (discussing Justice Scalia’s apparent 
change of philosophy vis-à-vis federal meddling in state redistricting disputes by first denying an 
emergency stay and then authoring the majority opinion in Branch, which benefited Republican 
Congressman Chip Pickering, son of Judge Charles Pickering, a longtime Scalia friend and 
turkey hunting partner).  
 85. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 918–19 (Scalia, J.) (describing as an “essential postulate[]” 
the “incontestible [sic] [concept] that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ 
Although the states surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they 
retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty[.]’ This is reflected throughout the 
Constitution’s text . . . .”) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (approving the Court’s refusal to uphold detailed regulations imposed by the 
district court on Arizona’s state prisons and stating, in this connection, that “[i]t is a bedrock 
principle of judicial restraint that a right be lodged firmly in the text or tradition of a specific 
constitutional provision before we will recognize it as fundamental”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (looking to the specific language of 
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logic dictates that the two approaches frequently should yield the 
same result; if federalism is the design underlying the Constitution, 
the plain meaning of its text should yield a “federalist” result. More 
specifically, it seems that a textualist approach to constitutional 
interpretation frequently generates a pro-state autonomy view of 
federalism.86  
However, in the context of Article I, Section 4, the two 
approaches yield opposite results. The “plain meaning” of 
“Legislature” is just that—the legislature. Because Article I, Section 4 
nowhere mentions state courts, they should play no part in 
redistricting. Yet, viewing the situation in broader, federalist terms 
counsels against this view. Redistricting is a state function: state 
courts can play a role in this process as they do when interpreting any 
law, and to remove a state entity in favor of a national entity violates 
the federalist principle underlying Article I, Section 4. 
II.  THE TEXTUALIST APPROACH TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 
Textualists believe that when determining whether an action or 
law violates the Constitution, a court should look first to the 
document’s text. This form of interpretation has been the topic of 
much scholarly debate,87 but its underlying rationale is logical: where 
 
the Constitution, concluding that “nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State 
of the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them 
in Congress,” and determining that the Tenth Amendment reserves those powers to the States); 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (basing the holding in part on the importance of 
maintaining a “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local”); Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457, 460 (1991) (O’Connor, J.) (“As every schoolchild learns, our 
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal 
Government. . . . Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who 
exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”); see also infra notes 121, 
123 (citing federalist statements by members of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts). 
 86. I thank Professor H. Jefferson Powell for this observation. See also supra notes 79–81 
and accompanying text (discussing cases favoring state autonomy). 
 87. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
25–38 (1982) (examining the strengths and weaknesses of textualist interpretation); Ronald 
Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION] (criticizing Justice 
Scalia’s scholarly arguments for textualism); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 113–22 (1990) (criticizing textualism 
as a mode of statutory interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra, at 65 (responding to Justice Scalia’s scholarly arguments for 
textualism); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991) (assessing Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence of statutory 
interpretation). 
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the Constitution’s “words are plain and clear, and [determinate] . . . 
there is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of 
interpretation.”88 Justice Scalia celebrates textualism as his guiding 
philosophy,89 and Chief Justice Rehnquist has spoken about the 
danger of courts’ departing too far from “the language of the 
Constitution that the people adopted.”90 Regardless of one’s opinion 
of textualism, it is an analysis worth exploring for the purposes of 
predicting the meaning that the Supreme Court will attach to the 
word “Legislature” in Article I, Section 4. 
A. The Literal Meaning: “Legislature” Means “Legislature” and No 
Other State Entity 
Looking only at the Constitution’s text, it appears that state 
legislatures alone have been granted the authority to draw 
congressional districts.91 As suggested by litigants and amici in Bush v. 
Gore, a court could hold that “[s]tate courts may not invoke even the 
state constitution to circumscribe this state legislative power.”92 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s statement in Bush v. Gore that “[t]his inquiry 
does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for 
the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures”93 seems 
equally applicable in this context––state legislatures should act alone 
in drawing congressional lines. 
 
 88. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 182 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 
(1892) (approving this maxim and highlighting that when words are ambiguous, 
“contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction” of a text merits greater 
consideration). 
 89. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 87, at 3, 13 (defending textualism and claiming that those who 
view the Constitution as “a charter for judges to develop an evolving common law of freedom of 
speech, of privacy rights, and the like . . . . frustrate[] the whole purpose of a written 
constitution”). 
 90. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698 
(1976). For then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 
(1857), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), exemplify the perils that can befall the 
nation if the Court abandons the Constitution’s text. See Rehnquist, supra, at 700–04. 
 91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections . . . shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”). 
 92. Brief of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party and Seeking Reversal at 5, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-
949); see also Brief for Petitioner at 47, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 
(2000) (No. 00-836). 
 93. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
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The next question to ask is whether a state legislature may 
delegate this power to another entity like a redistricting commission 
or court. The strictest view of the Constitution prohibits the 
legislature from delegation: the state legislature alone is given the 
authority to determine the congressional districts, and any attempt by 
another state entity to do so must be rejected. Another view is that 
the legislature may delegate the redistricting power, but that the 
delegation must be explicit. This leads to a very state-specific inquiry, 
requiring the reviewing court to determine whether the respective 
state legislature (or state constitution, or both) delegated its 
apportionment authority. The broadest view of the text is that a 
general authority of state courts to interpret state law through the 
state constitution—recognized by the legislature—permits state 
courts to hear redistricting disputes and use their equitable powers to 
remedy infirmities. Under this view, regardless of the Constitution’s 
delegation of power to state “Legislatures,” redistricting plans 
operate like any other law passed in the state and are subject to 
traditional judicial review. The authority for judicial review under a 
state constitution or statute coexists, and does not conflict with, any 
constitutionally granted right to the state legislature to redistrict.94 
Another aspect of Bush v. Gore and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton95 could play a role in this broad interpretation. If members 
of Congress are federal officers,96 their selection is a process subject to 
discrete federal constitutional requirements, like those used in 
appointing presidential electors. The federal nature of congressional 
seats removes all traditional aspects of state lawmaking and applies 
strict federal constitutional requirements. This view comports with 
the other specific constitutional requirements for electing members of 
Congress.97 If drawing congressional districts implicates Article I, 
Section 4, the literal requirement that only the “Legislature” draw the 
districts is invoked, and no other entity may do so. However, one 
 
 94. See also infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the parallel nature of the 
state and federal court systems, and the Framers’ belief that giving each system responsibility—
and at times autonomy—will enhance protection of constitutional rights). 
 95. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). In this case, the Court reversed Arkansas’ attempt to limit the 
terms of members of Congress. See id. at 783. 
 96. See id. at 805 n.17 (“The Clauses also reflect the idea that the Constitution treats both 
the President and Members of Congress as federal officers.”). 
 97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”); supra note 78 
(discussing the relative weakness of this distinction). 
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could argue that members of Congress are less exceptional than the 
president. Under this view, the requirements of Article I, Section 4 do 
not require divesting state courts of their preexisting right to judicial 
review.98 
The second part of Article I, Section 4, permits congressional 
regulation of House of Representative elections.99 Consistent with this 
power and the Fifteenth Amendment, a federal court may use its 
equitable powers to draw congressional lines under the Voting Rights 
Act, if the legislature fails to do so properly.100 Additionally, the 
Fifteenth Amendment and some of its supporting legislation, like the 
Voting Rights Act, specifically remove some state discretion in voting 
procedures.101 Viewed in this manner, a federal court could strip a 
state court of authority to use its existing state equity powers absent 
an express grant of such authority from the state legislature.102 A 
federal court also could stop a state court from entering the 
redistricting process if the state court violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment or a federal law like the Voting Rights Act. 
Although state courts could play a role if the state legislature 
conferred redistricting authority to another entity, a federal court 
could intervene whenever a state court’s interpretation of the 
statutory redistricting scheme at issue “[did] not fall within the 
boundaries of acceptable interpretation, but rather represent[ed] . . . a 
gross deviation from the scheme outlined in the statute.”103 In these 
circumstances, a federal constitutional question would be raised and 
the state’s constitution would have no role to play whatsoever.104 
 
 98. For example, Members of Congress are elected by only one district of people and are 
solely accountable to those constituents, whereas the president is accountable to the whole 
nation and has wide-sweeping powers. 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“[B]ut the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”). 
 100. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 19 (1975), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 785 
(acknowledging that in “exigent circumstances, [a court may] actually fashion[] the 
[redistricting] plan itself”); see also McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 148–49 (1981) (quoting 
the Senate Report with approval). 
 101. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554, 558 (S.D. Miss. 2002) 
(declining to allow Mississippi chancery courts to invoke their equity jurisdiction to draw the 
state’s congressional districts). 
 103. Epstein, supra note 70, at 619. Epstein uses this language in the context of defending 
the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore. See id. 
 104. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (vacating the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision partly because the Supreme Court was “unclear as to the 
extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the 
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B. “Legislature” as Part of a Wider Grant of Authority to States as 
Entities 
 Even the purest textualist looks to the meaning of the language 
in the Constitution as a whole, not just the lone word in a vacuum—
the search is for the meaning of the word as it applies to the text. A 
textualist could argue that Article I, like Article II, “does not create 
state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they 
come—as creatures born of, and constrained by, their state 
constitutions.”105 In Smiley v. Holm,106 the Court advised, “[w]herever 
the term ‘legislature’ is used in the Constitution it is necessary to 
consider the nature of the particular action in view.”107 In his Bush v. 
Gore dissent, Justice Stevens argued that both Article II, Section I 
and Article I, Section 4 “call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking 
capacity.”108 And in Grills v. Branigin,109 the district court rested its 
decision partly on the fact that the state election board had no judicial 
or legislative authority under the state’s constitution.110 Federalist No. 
78 further reflects an understanding on the part of the Framers that, 
in a republican government, judicial review would play a role in 
construing the statutes of a legislature.111 Viewed in this light, a state 
court has a clear role in construing the laws of the legislature, and can 
therefore use its equitable powers to redraw a state’s congressional 
 
legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2”). In this respect, the United States Supreme 
Court seemed to indicate that the Florida legislature did not confer authority on the Florida 
Supreme Court to rule on the choice of presidential electors. 
 105. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 107. Id. at 366. 
 108. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 124 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109. 284 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Ind. 1968), aff’d per curiam sub nom., Branigin v. Duddleston, 
391 U.S. 364 (1968). 
 110. See id. at 180. (“Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution clearly 
does not authorize the defendants, as members of the Election Board of Indiana, to create 
congressional districts. This power is granted to the Indiana General Assembly and the Election 
Board does not possess the legislative power under the Indiana Constitution nor does it possess 
judicial power under the Indiana Constitution.”). 
 111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”). Justice 
Scalia endorses the use of The Federalist in searching for a textualist interpretation of the 
Constitution, “not because [the authors] were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative 
and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent and 
informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally 
understood.” SCALIA, supra note 89, at 38. This view has been adopted by the Supreme Court, 
at least in some decisions. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997) (Scalia, J.) 
(viewing The Federalist “as indicative of the original understanding of the Constitution”). 
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districts if the legislature is unable to do so within the confines of 
either the state or Federal Constitution. 
The scant case law interpreting Article I, Section 4 reflects a view 
that “Legislature” in the Constitution means a state legislature acting 
in its ordinary, lawmaking capacity, as limited by its state constitution. 
In Smiley, the Court permitted a governor to veto a redistricting plan, 
stating, “the exercise of the [redistricting] authority must be in 
accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for 
legislative enactments.”112 Use of a voter initiative as “lawmaking 
power” has also been permitted.113 However, this can lead to two 
opposing conclusions. One conclusion is that—in contrast to a state 
governor, whose signature the state legislature requires to pass any 
new law—courts have no actual role in enacting legislation, and so 
cannot act in a “legislative capacity” by drawing lines without express 
permission of the legislature. Alternatively, one could conclude that 
the normal role of state courts in construing and interpreting statutes 
applies equally to redistricting situations—if the state courts have 
equitable powers derived from their state’s constitution or laws, they 
can act to redraw congressional districts to remedy constitutional or 
statutory infirmity.114 One’s choice of interpretation in this regard 
could make the finding of state court authority under Article I, 
Section 4 dispositive. 
However, the cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has not 
taken the most literal view of “Legislature.” In Baker v. Carr, Justice 
Douglas explained that, with few exceptions, “the Court has never 
thought the protection of voting rights was beyond judicial 
cognizance.”115 There is nothing in these dicta to indicate that state 
courts have any less “judicial cognizance” than federal courts. In 
Growe v. Emison,116 the Supreme Court emphasized that both state 
 
 112. 285 U.S. at 367. 
 113. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916) (upholding an Ohio 
initiative that enabled voters to approve or disapprove redistricting). 
 114. By its very definition, equity is not a lawmaking process; it is limited to the facts of the 
particular case before the court. 
 115. 369 U.S. 186, 249–50 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). The exceptions listed by Justice 
Douglas included Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 
(1948), and South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). In each of these cases, the Court (with some 
divergence in terms of specific language) declined jurisdiction on political question grounds 
(something the Court changed in Baker). For a succinct explanation of the political question 
rationale, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 277–78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 116. 507 U.S. 25 (1994). 
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legislatures and state courts are proper “agents of apportionment,”117 
and that federal courts must defer to state action “where the State, 
through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that 
highly political task itself.”118 However, the Article I, Section 4 issue 
was not before the Growe Court—both parties had conceded that the 
state court had jurisdiction to redraw the congressional districts.119 
A strict textual approach to this issue may conclude that the 
redistricting power belongs to the state legislature alone. From this 
perspective, although state courts may hear challenges to 
congressional redistricting schemes, they cannot actually redraw the 
districts absent a delegation of authority directly from the state 
legislature. 
III.  THE FEDERALIST APPROACH TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 
Although the text of the Constitution seems to indicate that state 
legislatures should act alone in drawing congressional districts, 
federalism counsels against removing state courts from this process. 
The Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism” approach encourages those 
evaluating the Constitution to “appreciate the significance of 
federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution.”120 The Framers 
embraced a system of dual sovereignty to protect the people; 
therefore, the federal government should not interfere with the 
traditional roles of state governments and vice-versa.121 Respect for 
federalism requires respect for states as entire entities—“[t]he 
different governments will control each other, at the same time that 
each will be controlled by itself.”122 The states as entities have been 
granted the authority to draw their congressional districts through 
both Article I, Section 4 and Article I, Section 2; if the legislature fails 
to redistrict properly, the courts of the state should have an 
opportunity to correct the problems before the federal government, 
 
 117. Id. at 34. 
 118. Id. at 33. 
 119. See id. at 32 (“The parties do not dispute that both [state and federal] courts had 
jurisdiction to consider the complaints before them.”). 
 120. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 121. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“That the States may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my 
view, as the corollary proposition that the Federal Government must be held within the 
boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States.”). 
 122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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through its courts, enters the dispute.123 Particularly in the redistricting 
context, one commentator has complained that the difficulty of the 
requirements of redistricting and the involvement of federal courts 
“can only be described as a hostile takeover of the districting 
process—a process the Constitution commits to the states—by the 
federal judiciary.”124 Invoking Article I, Section 4 to keep state courts 
out of the redistricting process will only perpetuate the coup by the 
federal judiciary. In light of the federalist scheme of the Constitution, 
Article I, Section 4 grants authority to state courts to review 
congressional districts drawn by state legislatures. In this capacity, 
state courts should also be permitted to use their equitable powers to 
redistrict the state.  
A. Analysis of Article I, Section 4 
If a federal court strips a state court of jurisdiction over the 
redistricting process in the name of protecting the state legislature, 
the most likely result will be that the federal court itself will take over 
the process.125 There is no doubt that the initial authority for drawing 
 
 123. The Court has specifically told federal courts to stay out of redistricting disputes to 
further the spirit of comity and federalism. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34 (applying Germano and 
explaining that the lower court improperly established only a deadline for the state legislature, 
“ignoring the possibility and legitimacy of judicial resolution” of the redistricting dispute); see 
also id. at 33 (noting that “state courts have a significant role in redistricting”). This illustrates 
part of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts’ approach to state-federal relations, and underscores 
the Court’s belief that state courts play a vital role in protecting their citizens’ constitutional 
rights. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (“We are unwilling to 
assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United 
States.”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (Powell, J.) (stating that the Court is 
“unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to 
constitutional rights in the . . . courts of the several States”). 
 124. Melissa L. Saunders, The Dirty Little Secrets of Shaw, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 
146–47 (2000). 
 125. If the state legislature has been unable to develop a redistricting scheme that can be 
signed into law, a court will have to create a plan of its own. In this situation, the only question 
is which court, state or federal, will be doing the line drawing. For this reason, forum shopping 
in redistricting litigation is quite prevalent. See Pamala S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some 
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1993) (“One-person, one-vote 
provides a wedge for partisan participation in the litigation process, permits a variety of forum-
shopping stratagems, and, in combination with remedial doctrines, provides opportunities for 
the two major political parties to advance conceptions of the Act that serve their partisan 
ends.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 101–04 (1996) (discussing forum shopping in redistricting litigation); see 
also Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 878, 880 
n.24 (2001) (listing some recent examples of forum shopping in redistricting litigation). 
071604 WILSON.DOC 9/17/2004 2:04 PM 
1390 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1367 
congressional districts lies with legislatures;126 state courts play a role 
only in challenges to the plan developed by the legislature. In Branch 
v. Smith, the federal court ignored the overall constitutional scheme, 
which permits states to establish their own congressional boundaries. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has applauded state courts for their 
efforts in settling redistricting disputes.127 
Although the Court did not address the Article I, Section 4 issue 
in Growe, the holding and dicta of Growe are instructive about the 
Court’s skepticism concerning the role of federal courts in the 
redistricting process. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
emphasized principles of comity and federalism in denying the federal 
court’s effort to employ its own redistricting plan in place of the state 
court’s.128 The Court equated “Germano deferral” with the Pullman 
doctrine.129 As Justice Scalia succinctly explained, “Pullman deferral 
recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely resolve the 
constitutionality of a state statute, just as Germano deferral 
recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely involve 
themselves in redistricting.”130 This statement should not be ignored 
when lower courts address the Article I, Section 4 issue. 
 
 126. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 586 (1964), for the proposition that “reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative 
consideration and determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a 
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion 
after having an adequate opportunity to do so”). 
 127. See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (“The power of the judiciary of a state 
to require . . . a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but 
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.”); Md. Comm. 
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674 (1964) (“We applaud the willingness of state 
courts to assume jurisdiction and render decision in cases involving challenges to state 
legislative apportionment schemes.”). Although both of these cases concerned state legislative 
apportionment plans, the Court in Growe renewed its “adherence to the principles expressed in 
Germano” in a case involving a state court’s involvement in creating both state legislative and 
congressional redistricting plans. 507 U.S. at 34. 
 128. Growe, 507 U.S. at 35–36. 
 129. See id. at 32 n.1 (“We have referred to the Pullman doctrine as a form of ‘abstention.’ 
To bring out more clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that require 
dismissal of a suit and those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it would be 
preferable to speak of Pullman ‘deferral.’”) (citation omitted). 
 130. Id. Pullman abstention is invoked by federal courts to avoid ruling on sensitive areas of 
state social policy. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) 
(refusing to hear a claim that rules of the Texas Railroad Commission sleeping car trains 
operated in a racially discriminatory manner because it presented an issue that “touches a 
sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no 
alternative to its adjudication is open”). For a general overview of courts’ use of the Pullman 
Doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.2.1 (4th ed. 2003). 
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A recent state supreme court case, Alexander v. Taylor,131 
summarized its view of Growe’s command in this way: 
The failure of a legislature to act is a violation of the state’s citizens’ 
constitutional rights under [Article] I, [Section] 2 and the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment . . . . Such a failure is subject to redress by 
the state court if it will act and only by the federal court if it will 
not.132 
This view of the situation comports best with the Supreme Court’s 
command; federal courts should defer to state courts unless and until 
those courts fail to act on their citizens’ behalf. The Alexander court 
looked to the command of Baker v. Carr as justifying its role in the 
redistricting process: Baker v. Carr allowed courts, both federal and 
state, to play a role in the redistricting process, and some of the 
earliest cases following Baker seem rooted at least partly in Article I, 
Section 4.133 
The impending dispute over Article I, Section 4’s role in 
redistricting litigation highlights an ongoing tension between states 
and the federal government––one inherent in the Voting Rights Act. 
The Act was passed in response to attempts by southern states, 
including their courts, to dilute the voting power of minorities. There 
is little dispute that the assertion of federal power to protect this right 
was warranted.134 However, as long as the Voting Rights Act singles 
out some individual states for special federal restrictions,135 it is 
 
 131. 51 P.3d 1204 (Okla. 2002). 
 132. Id. at 1209. 
 133. See id.: 
Many state legislatures . . . routinely refused to reapportion themselves, and many 
state courts . . . routinely ruled that they were powerless to do anything about it. 
Thus, something had to be done and was done in Baker v. Carr. The [C]ourt in Baker 
v. Carr also recognized that courts have jurisdiction in congressional redistricting 
matters under [Article] I, [Section] 4 of the federal constitution, pointing out, “The 
first cases involved the redistricting of states under [Article] I, [Section] 4.” 
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962)). 
 134. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? 
Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions about the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 817, 817 (1998) (discussing the history that southern states and their courts have of 
“defying the rule of law, particularly federal constitutional law, in the areas of race and criminal 
justice”); Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. 
L. REV. 869, 870–86, 929–32 (1994) (arguing that these changes instituted by the Warren Court 
that expanded federal involvement in state courts were arguably justified because of the 
extreme injustice occurring at the time, but that—in light of the achievements of the preexisting 
system of state-federal comity—the Warren Court’s actions should now be reined in to prevent 
a permanent alteration of America’s federal system). 
 135. See supra notes 7 and 42 and accompanying text. 
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particularly important for federal courts to observe traditional 
principles of comity, not only out of respect for federalism, but also to 
permit state courts to play the role in the enforcement of federal law 
anticipated by the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism. 
B. Viewing Article I, Section 4 in Light of the New Federalism 
Decisions 
The Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism jurisprudence may also 
inform the potential conflict between state and federal courts. If one 
looks to the Supreme Court’s aggressive protection of states both in 
terms of autonomy and in terms of viewing states as guardians of 
constitutional rights, the likelihood of state courts being granted a 
role in the redistricting process is more likely. 
Although this Note will not go through various Supreme Court 
opinions to prove this point, some of the Court’s language may prove 
enlightening. For example, a majority of the current Court has stated 
that “state legislatures are not subject to federal direction.”136 If state 
legislatures are not subject to federal direction, why should a 
perfectly competent state court, whose actions comport with federal 
constitutional and statutory requirements, subject itself to federal 
direction? Additionally, in the context of the Commerce Clause, the 
Supreme Court has demanded a separation between “what is truly 
national and what is truly local.”137 Numerous other cases support the 
“residuary and inviolable sovereignty”138 of the states.139 
In view of this case law, if the constitutional question raised in 
Branch returned to the Supreme Court in the course of another 
redistricting dispute, it could present the Rehnquist Court with 
another opportunity to advance its New Federalist cause. In the 
redistricting context, state courts could be given the opportunity both 
 
 136. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997); see also New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon 
Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”). 
 137. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995). 
 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 139. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks 
authority under Article I to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from private suits in their own 
courts); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680 
(1999) (insisting that “a State’s express waiver of sovereign immunity [must] be unequivocal.”); 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks authority 
under Article I to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from private suits in federal court). 
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to protect their own sovereignty and to safeguard their citizens’ 
constitutional rights. 
C. Aspects of Competitive Federalism Served by State Court 
Involvement 
The concept of competitive federalism is noted best in Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann:140 “It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”141 This aspect of federalism can affect state courts in 
redistricting disputes: the courts can use novel state laws and state 
constitutional interpretations to protect the rights of voters.142 The 
prospect of this experimentation may be stifled if state courts and 
state constitutions are removed from the redistricting process. 
Competition for taxpayers among states can lead to a greater 
protection of rights.143 In the redistricting context, for example, a state 
may find that the equal protection clause of its constitution provides 
greater protection of its citizens’ rights than the federal equal 
protection clause.144 
 
 140. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 141. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 142. Justice Brennan noted the importance of this element of federalism, claiming, “[s]tate 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond 
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.” William J. Brennan, Jr., 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
Brennan noted the growing number of state courts “construing state constitutional counterparts 
of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection 
than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.” Id. at 495. State courts have 
recognized rights as diverse as the right to possess and use marijuana at home, Ravin v. State, 
537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), to the right to an equally funded public education, Robinson v. 
Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). For a lengthier list of rights recognized by state courts (and 
what one scholar perceives as a threat that judicial elections pose to these rights), see Paul D. 
Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 99–107 (Summer 1998). 
 143. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (book review): 
If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen’s share of the overhead 
costs of government is proportionately reduced. Since people are better able to move 
among states or communities than to emigrate from the United States, competition 
among governments for taxpayers will be far stronger at the state and local than at 
the federal level. 
 144. Such a claim has succeeded in Alaska in the state legislative redistricting context. Kenai 
Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1369 (Alaska 1987) (requiring proof of “a consistent 
degradation of a minority’s voting power” to make out an equal protection violation under the 
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Even if one applies the alternative view to competitive 
federalism—that politicians will experiment less out of fear of losing 
their jobs145––a positive result is yielded in the redistricting context. If 
state courts are more political, risk-averse redistricting bodies, these 
courts will, at the least, enforce rights as they currently exist.146 
Regardless, if state courts overstep their bounds through 
experimentation that violates federal law or the Constitution, federal 
courts can continue to provide a remedy to those whose rights are 
violated by state courts. With federal courts acting as the extra level 
of protection envisioned by the Founders,147 competitive federalism 
demands permitting state courts to play a role in the redistricting 
process. 
D. Policy Considerations Supporting a Federalist View of Article I, 
Section 4 
Additional policy considerations support the federalist view of 
Article I, Section 4.148 State court judges are often elected or subject 
 
Alaska constitution, which is stricter than the Federal Constitution’s mandate). Plaintiffs 
challenging state legislative redistricting in Texas have prevailed using the state’s Equal Rights 
Amendment. See James C. Harrington & Judith Sanders-Castro, Legislative Redistricting in 
1991–1992: The Texas Bill of Rights v. The Voting Rights Act, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 33 (1994). 
Similar claims have been raised in state redistricting suits in other states. See, e.g., In re 
Apportionment Law, 263 So.2d 797, 807 (Fla. 1972) (No. 42253) (declining to extend protection, 
holding, “[t]here are no provisions in the Florida Constitution relating to apportionment of the 
legislature more stringent than those of the United States Constitution”); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Americans for the Defense of Constitutional Rights at 12, Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 
377 (N.C. 2002) (urging use of the state equal protection clause to limit further the political and 
racial gerrymanders in state legislative apportionment plans) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 145. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980): 
[T]he reelection motive, the lack of sorting by risk preferences, external effects, and 
the impact of migration combine to prevent many searches from being carried out 
and to bias those projects that are undertaken. If state and local governments are 
supposed to be “laboratories,” then [the author’s] model predicts that few useful 
experiments will be carried out by them. 
(citing New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 146. These rights include, most crucially for the purposes of redistricting, the right to one-
person, one-vote representation highlighted in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and the 
additional protections provided by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
 147. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 148. For a contrary view, urging more active involvement of federal courts in redistricting 
litigation, see generally Note, supra note 125. 
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to recall149 by the voters of their respective states. Although historical 
evidence indicates that electing judges violates the Framers’ concept 
of an independent judiciary,150 the fact that elected judges may behave 
more like politicians is ideal in the redistricting context: redistricting 
is inherently political, and it makes sense for the more accountable of 
the two judicial systems to enter this political thicket. If state court 
judges give in to partisan temptations in redistricting their respective 
states, there is a political solution for the people.151 Further, federal 
courts are not above partisan temptation: In evaluating state 
legislative redistricting plans, federal judges are much more likely to 
rule against plans drawn by the party of which they are not members 
than they are to vote against plans drawn by their own party.152 
Although no data are available about federal judges’ rulings on 
congressional redistricting plans, it is doubtful that such data would 
show dramatically different results. 
As Justice Ginsberg has noted, “the slim judicial competence to 
draw district lines weigh[s] heavily against judicial intervention in 
apportionment decisions . . . .”153 Although this is true and state courts 
should not eagerly undertake this role, if a court must draw district 
lines, a state court that is more closely connected to the people 
 
 149. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725 (“[I]n only twelve states are most judges not electorally 
accountable to the citizenry . . . [Many of these states] choose lower or local judges 
electorally . . . .”).  
 150. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 111, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or 
other, be fatal to [the judiciary’s] necessary independence.”); see also ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) 
(arguing that states electing their judges will ultimately discover the elections attack “not 
judicial power only but the democratic republic itself”). For an analysis of elected state judges, 
see Croley, supra note 149. Croley lists several historical reasons contributing to the rise of 
elected state judiciaries: Marbury v. Madison, Jacksonianism, participation in politics by settlers 
from the western frontier, judicial rulings favorable to creditors, resistance to the English 
common law, and judicial corruption. Id. at 717. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to 
discuss, this history could lead one to believe that, contrary to much existing scholarly opinion, 
having an election mechanism on state courts ultimately confers greater protection to the 
judiciary as one entity because citizens feel they have at least one avenue of recourse (short of 
constitutional amendment) against an otherwise independent branch of government. 
 151. Furthermore, a state court judge whose own congressional reapportionment plan 
violates federal law or the Constitution can be subject to review by a federal court. 
 152. Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research: 
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413, 417 (1995). No similar 
study has been done with respect to state courts. 
 153. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934–35 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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through election and geography154 appears marginally more 
competent to do so. A state judge’s need to be more politically aware 
of his state and community for reelection purposes will also aid the 
judge in drawing district lines.155 
Some call for the use of the public law litigation model in hearing 
redistricting cases.156 A state court judge facing reelection would seem 
more likely to evaluate the wide interests involved in redistricting 
litigation commanded by the public law litigation model. A state 
judge subject to reelection has the most to lose in drawing 
congressional districts; therefore, even if a judge attempts to skew 
district lines in a partisan manner, she would be best served to appear 
to listen to as many affected parties as possible in the course of the 
litigation. Additionally, state judges will want their treatment of 
litigants and the overall tenor of their trials to appear maximally 
nonpartisan. In this connection, the public law litigation model would 
assist state court judges to pursue this goal. A federal judge, having 
already secured life tenure, has less incentive to pursue such a novel 
mode of adjudication. 
Another reason to allow state courts to play a greater role in the 
redistricting process is to preserve the integrity of the federal courts. 
The political pressures inherent to redistricting schemes strain the 
“least dangerous” 157 branch of government—as evidenced by federal 
judges’ preference, conscious or subconscious, for their own party’s 
redistricting plans.158 Federal courts will maintain their proper role by 
providing an additional check against the potential excesses of state 
 
 154. Lower state courts have jurisdiction over smaller numbers of citizens and are therefore 
literally “closer to the people”; obviously a state supreme court in a state with more than one 
federal judicial district oversees a larger number of people than a federal district court in that 
state. 
 155. Under the model suggested by this Note, citizens and academics alike can further test 
their faith in their elected state judges, while maintaining the constitutional safeguard of federal 
judges who, at least theoretically, are above the partisan fray of the suits before them if the state 
court violates the Constitution. 
 156. See Note, supra note 125, at 899–900 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1976)). The public law model calls for a 
“diffused adversarial structure” in which judges take a broader view of standing in hope of 
facilitating a solution to a complex problem of social policy. Chayes, supra, at 1308. Although 
the article addresses use of the public law model in federal courts, it concedes that 
“corresponding departures from the tradition [judicial] model in the state courts” also occur. Id. 
at 1284 n.12. 
 157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 111, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 158. See supra notes 84 and 152. 
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courts, and will also preserve their own political capital by showing 
restraint before entering disputes. 
When Article I, Section 4 is analyzed in light of the entire 
Constitution, a more holistic meaning to the text emerges. Taken in 
context, the meaning of “Legislature” flows from the federalist nature 
of the Constitution and the transfer of power from the federal 
government to the states (subject to the individual state’s own 
constitution and delegations of power to courts). Both policy and 
practical rationales support this interpretation. State courts should 
play a role in the redistricting process at the state level, and federal 
courts should not attempt to strip state courts of their authority in this 
important, constitutionally guaranteed role. 
CONCLUSION 
Examining both textual and federalist approaches to Article I, 
Section 4, reveals a conflict between the two interpretations that must 
be resolved by courts. Courts should read the term “Legislature” as 
used in this part of the Constitution taking into consideration similar 
passages elsewhere and the structure of the document as a whole; 
doing so fosters a broader, federalist conception of the state as an 
entity.159 State legislatures have principal and initial authority to draw 
congressional districts, but this authority is subject to review by the 
courts of that state.160 If a state legislature has failed to redistrict its 
congressional delegation properly, a state court may exercise its 
equitable powers to redistrict as long as some power to do so exists 
under the state constitution, or pursuant to a delegation of authority 
from the legislature. Principles of comity and federalism require 
federal courts to abstain from interfering with this process, unless and 
until the state courts cannot or will not enforce legal redistricting 
schemes. 
The impending conflict surrounding Article I, Section 4 in the 
redistricting context may manifest a surprising contrast between the 
two often-similar positions of strict textualist and federalist 
constitutional interpretations. Even a textualist, however, may view 
 
 159. Apparently the Colorado Supreme Court agrees with this assertion, because it recently 
asserted jurisdiction over a redistricting dispute and rejected an attempt by the state legislature 
to enact another redistricting plan (replacing the plan enacted after the 2000 census). See People 
ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not 
grant redistricting power to the state legislatures exclusively, but instead, to the states generally. 
The state may draw congressional districts via any process that it deems appropriate.”). 
 160. This assumes a judicial review mechanism within every state constitution. 
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Article I, Section 4 as conferring power on the state judiciary, even in 
the absence of explicit language granting this power. Under this view, 
power is initially conferred on state legislatures and then exercised in 
the manner prescribed by the state’s constitution and laws, including 
judicial action by state courts. However, if an interpretive conflict 
persists, the federalist nature of the Constitution and the two 
provisions granting states the authority to redistrict their 
congressional seats command the conclusion that state courts may 
assert jurisdiction over this process. In light of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudential command for renewed comity and federalism by the 
federal courts, a federal court should enter this political thicket only 
after both the state legislature and its courts have attempted to 
redistrict a state’s congressional lines. 
